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Abstract
I nt h i sp a p e rw ei n v e s t i g a t ee c o n o m i cg r o w t hi ne c o n o m i e sw h e r e
households face liquidity constraints, and young agents rely on the
family to ¯nance their investments in education. We analyze the type
of family aid in which youths can borrow because their parents guar-
antee the loan repayment with their income. In an OLG model of
economic growth, it is shown how multiple equilibria can arise. A sta-
ble trap of low-development is characterized by high fertility rates and
low investment in human capital. On the other hand, economies with
a su±ciently low starting rate of fertility grow according to a process
that may describe a demographic transition. In this case, borrow-
ing constraints gradually vanish and the process of growth reaches a
steady state characterized by the optimality of fertility and school-
ing choices. Econometric evidence on the signi¯cant roles of family
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1income and size, and credit constraints among the determinants of in-
ternational secondary school enrollment rates is provided to support
t h em a i nh y p o t h e s e so ft h em o d e l .
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1 Introduction
An important tradition in the theoretical and applied analyses of economic
development concentrates on human capital and fertility. Human capital and
the rate of population growth are economic and demographic phenomena
deeply rooted in the family's organization and behavior. From this point
of view economists (e.g., Becker, Murphy and Tamura, 1990; Tamura, 1996;
Galor and Weil, 1998; Dahan and Tsiddon, 1998) analyze the demographic
transition (Caldwell, 1976) from the state of low development with high
fertility to that of a growing economy with low fertility rate1.
In recent years, models of economic growth with multiple equilibria have
been put forward to provide a comprehensive account of poverty traps (Azari-
adis, 1996). Aggregate externalities in human capital production and coor-
dination failure (Lucas, 1988; Azariadis and Drazen, 1990) may hinder the
development of an education system in poor countries. The same negative
in°uence on human capital can be ascribed to capital market imperfections
(De Gregorio, 1996). Among the most relevant are asymmetric information
owned by banks and households, and the low quality of human capital as
a collateral (Becker, 1993). An important strand of research (e.g., Banerjee
and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993) assumes borrowing constraints on
investments in education to analyze the evolution of income distribution and
economic growth. Galor and Zeira (1993) assume credit markets in which
there are costs that borrowers pay in terms of interest rates higher than lend-
ing rates. Due to this imperfection, individuals who invest in education rely
on bequests of their parents, and economic growth depends on the initial
distribution of wealth.
Credit market imperfections play a signi¯cant role in recent models of
growth with endogenous determination of fertility and human capital. Galor
1Recent reviews of the literature on endogenous population and economic growth are
Ehrlich and Lui (1997) and Nerlove and Raut (1997).
2and Weil (2000) make an ambitious attempt to model the transition from a
Malthusian regime of economic growth to a modern regime characterized by
the negative relation between fertility and the rate of growth of per capita
income. The crucial assumption in Galor and Weil (2000) is the comple-
mentarity of education and technological progress. The model gives rise to a
virtuous circle between these two forms of knowledge production which raise
wages and the return to child quality. Technical change causes substitution
of child education for number of children, and triggers the onset of a demo-
graphic transition. Dahan and Tsiddon (1998) propose a model in which
population is composed of skilled and unskilled agents. Due to capital mar-
ket imperfections, children's education depends on bequests from the parents.
The dynamics of population and human capital di®er in the two classes of
agents, and the demographic transition depends on income distribution.
In this paper we examine the role of the family in the ¯nance of invest-
ments in education and, in particular, we investigate how altruistic parents
who face borrowing constraints may reduce fertility to increase children's hu-
man capital. This is the main innovation of our model with respect to the
existing macroeconomic literature on endogenous fertility which explains the
decline in population growth as a by-product of economic growth. Such a
modeling strategy downplays the active role of the family in the ¯nance of
investments in education and in economic growth. This role can be appre-
ciated by putting together three important pieces of evidence arising from
the applied literature on human capital, the family and economic growth. In
fact, constraints on household borrowing have negative e®ects on aggregate
educational attainment in cross-country econometric estimates presented in
De Gregorio (1996). When credit is constrained, empirical studies of the eco-
nomics of the family (e.g., Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman, 1989; Hanushek,
1992; Haveman and Wolfe, 1995), and of the literature on economic devel-
opment (e.g., Schultz, 1988; Parish and Willis, 1993 ) show that individual
educational attainment depends on family resources and family size. A sig-
ni¯cant negative parameter of family size is shown by Galor and Zang (1997)
in cross-country regressions of the rate of growth of per capita income.
These econometric results strongly suggest a picture of the demographic
transition in which the rate of fertility is an important instrument which
altruistic parents may regulate to compensate for limited access to ¯nancial
resources for children's education. Our model provides a new theoretical
account of the endogenous behavior of the family in the demographic tran-
3sition.
While most of the literature on liquidity constraints and human capital
deals with bequests of parents to children, we examine the case in which
youths can borrow because their parents guarantee the loan repayment with
their income.
In the model that we propose the economic resources and size of the
family become fundamental determinants of the educational choice because
we assume that banks lend money proportionally to the parents' income. The
family's income can be thought of as the collateral banks require to ¯nance
single family members. In an overlapping generations approach, adults are
altruistic toward their children, therefore tending to tradeo® the positive
e®ects on utility of one more child against the negative e®ects caused by
tighter credit constraints and lower investment in education. Indeed, the
family's income is a common resource that each young agent shares with
other members. As family size grows, the amount of credit available to each
member shrinks.
The dynamics of fertility and education are linked through the ¯nancial
system. As a consequence of initial values of the rate of population growth,
the model can describe economic growth as a low-development trap in high
fertility economies characterized by heavy household borrowing constraints
and low investment in knowledge. Conversely, a demographic transition could
be experienced by economies that grow fast because parents - generation after
generation { have fewer children and devote a growing amount of income to
their education.
This paper shares with Galor and Zang (1997) the same focus on family
size among the determinants of human capital and economic growth. In their
article, under borrowing constraints, individual agents can ¯nance schooling
costs with a bequest that depends negatively on family size. Fertility is ex-
ogenous and has a negative in°uence both on the proportion of the labor force
that becomes skilled workers, and on steady state per capita income. Our
analysis seems complementary to that of Galor and Zang (1997) since it con-
cerns a di®erent type of funds for investment in education and concentrates
on the dynamics of fertility.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a general OLG
model in which education is ¯nanced by loan contracts between young agents
and banks with the guarantee of the parent's income. In section 3, the
model is analyzed under the assumption of a small open economy and perfect
4credit markets. In section 4 we assume investment in human capital can be
¯nanced only with the aid of the family, and derive multiple equilibria from
the model. Section 5 contains results of cross-country panel regressions of
the secondary school enrollment rate againts variables proxying for family
size and resources, and ¯nancial development. Conclusions follow in section
6.
2 The model
This section puts forward a general model of growth in which altruistic par-
ents make decisions on consumption, savings, number and quality of children.
The agent's life is summarized in three ages: childhood, middle age and old
age; and in every period population is made up of three overlapping gener-
ations. Young agents acquire skills both from their parents and attending
schools, which requires full time e®ort. Students ¯nance their education by
borrowing from banks. The credit market is imperfect and young individuals
can borrow only up to an amount which banks establish commensurate to
a collateral provided to children by their families. Adults are employed in a
private sector that produces goods with physical and human capital inputs.
Adults have children and allocate their time endowment net of leisure - nor-
malized to one - to work and child care. Saving during the meddle age allows
consumption in old age. The last generation owns physical capital.
2.1 Technology
Firms produce a single homogeneous good Yt under perfectly competitive
conditions, with physical capital Kt and labor in e®ective units as inputs.
The labor force is composed by Nt adults, each of whom is endowed with et
units of education; hence the maximum amount of e±ciency units of labor
is Lt = etNt. However, each adult has nt =
Nt+1
Nt children, and child rearing
takes ¿ hours per child. Hence, the total amount of e±ciency units of labor
is Lt(1 ¡ nt¿), where (1 ¡ nt¿) represents hours spent on the job. A well-
behaved concave production function with constant returns to scale describes
production technology:
Yt = F [Kt;L t(1 ¡ nt¿)] = Lt(1 ¡ nt¿)yt;
5where
yt = f (kt)a n dkt = Kt=Lt(1 ¡ nt¿);
Hence, yt is output per unit of e®ective labor, and kt is the ratio of capital on
labor input measured in e±ciency units. We assume that the capital stock
depreciates fully in one generation.
Factors of production are paid their marginal contribution to production:
R(kt)=fk (kt)( 1 )
w(kt)=f (kt) ¡ ktfk (kt)( 2 )
where R(kt) is the gross yield on loans, and w(kt) is the wage rate per
e±ciency unit of labor. The adult's earnings are denoted It:
It = etw(kt)(1¡ nt¿)
Human capital of young individuals born in period t -t h a tw ed e n o t eet+1-
is produced with full time e®ort and two inputs: knowledge of the parents





t+1;a 2 (0;1): (3)
The role of parents' education in equation (3) is that of an intergenera-
tional externality. Schooling activity requires material resources and students
must ¯nance the consequent expenditures by borrowing in the credit mar-
ket. The parameter A represents the level of technology in human capital
production. This technology shows constant returns to scale, and the stock
of knowledge does not depreciate, hence, if enough resources are devoted to
human capital accumulation it can proceed in the future without limit.
2.2 Adult behavior
Adult agents devote income earned on the job to the welfare of their family.
Preferences of adults include their life-cycle consumption, number and educa-












j is consumption in period j of an individual born in period i. In-
vestment in human capital enters the utility function of adults both because
it approximates the future welfare of children and the noneconomic value
of knowledge. The cost of education bt+1 includes consumption of the ¯rst
generation.
Parents can a®ect the amount of resources children spend for human cap-
ital investment when, as a consequence of credit market imperfections, child
borrowing is constrained and the family provides collateral in loan contracts
of children. Otherwise, education can be ¯nanced without restrictions. Here,
we denote with bo
t+1the unrestricted choice of investment in education, and
with bc
t+1the constrained choice. The following household maximization pro-


















R(kt+1) + btR(kt) · etw(kt)(1¡ nt¿):
(5)
The life-cycle budget constraint derives from adult's allocation of labour
earnings to loan repayment and present and future consumption.
Problem (5) can be speci¯ed in two di®erent ways according to the value
of the investment in education: bo
t+1or bc
t+1.The main di®erence lies in the
dependence of the constrained value bc
t+1 on the fertility rate nt,s i n c et h e
optimal choice of human capital investment is a function of future fertility of
children but does not depend on their family size: As will be clear in Section
4 when parents choose the number of children they take into account the
negative e®ect of one more child on children's resources for education.
2.3 Child behavior
During childhood individuals acquire skills through their relations with the
adult population. This process of knowledge transfer must be supported by
7expensive activities of learning. We can easily think about schooling, or less
formal means for information and knowledge transmission which have some
cost (books and magazines; computers and tvs; journeys; etc.). The main
reason for investment in human capital is the return that children will gain
in middle age in the labor market. Here we abstract from the important
non market value of knowledge and culture that explains part of people's
choices.
2.3.1 Optimal choice of human capital investment
During the ¯rst part of their life agents choose the level of education they will
be endowed with when adult. Children are neutral to risk, and the optimal






















t+1denote expectation taken at time t on kt+1, nt+1:
We assume that agents have perfect foresight. Given eq. (3), problem (6) is
concave in bt+1 and the following ¯rst order condition is su±cient to maximize



















=0 ( 7 )
From equation (7) the following function for the optimal choice of expen-























The optimal value bo
t+1is a linear function of the parents' human capital,
and an increasing function of the capital to labor ratio. A peculiar feature
of the decision rule eq. (8) is its dependence on the size of the family that
a young agent will build in the future. She has to foresee not only future
wage and interest rate but also her choice as an adult with respect to the
number of children. Higher fertility reduces the net returns of investment in
education because less e®ort can be applied on the job.
82.3.2 The ¯nance of educational expenditures
Education has a direct cost that students ¯nance by borrowing on a credit
market that is not perfect. Human capital has a high degree of illiquid-
ity, slavery is prohibited and human capital cannot serve as collateral. To
lend money, banks require concrete collateral, and income and wealth of the
parents are actually among the most common. Here we assume that there
is agreement in the family with respect to the educational programs of the
children.
Loan contracts involving families could be rationalized as a case of
group lending (e.g. Varian, 1990; Besley and Coate, 1995). In undeveloped
economies, where banks have limited power against borrowers who do not
repay their debts, contracts that involve the joint liability of a group of
lenders can increase the repayment ratio. In a similar way we assume that
altruistic parents may provide collateral to debt contracts of their children
because they have tight control over repayment of loans (see Banerjee and
Newman, 1993).
A child born at time t applies for a loan Dt that she will spend on her
educational project: Dt = bt+1. Even if from this investment she will get
a certain return V (Dt), she cannot borrow by pledging her future earnings.
Parents care about her welfare, and provide a collateral Ct out of their in-
come. The outcome of investments in human capital is not uncertain, but
loan repayment can be under risk due to moral hazard arguments. Rational
children always spend the amount they borrow in education, but when they
become adult they might renege on this debt, for example leaving the coun-
try to ¯nd a job abroad. From the point of view of lenders, adult's income is
a reliable collateral in an institutional context in which there is su±cient en-
forcement of property rights. On the other hand, parents have some control
over children's behavior. If children do not repay a loan when they become
adult, we assume that - with probability p - parents can punish them and
recover the lost collateral.
As a consequence, lenders and parents make loans of the amount that
ensures repayment. When children repay their debt, net returns are
V (Dt) ¡ DtRt+1;
while in the opposite choice they expect to earn:
9V (Dt) ¡ pCtRt+1:
Hence, loan repayment is the best decision when:
V (Dt) ¡ DtRt+1 ¸ V (Dt) ¡ pCtRt+1;
which means: Dt · pCt:
Children's borrowing depends on the value of collateral Ct that parents
provide. In this imperfect market for household loans lenders and borrowers
have asymmetric information, hence lenders estimate the household's relia-
bility and sign contracts only up to a maximum amount of collateral. Lenders
set the maximum amount of family's borrowing on the basis of its labor earn-
ings, which is an information easily available to banks. Other information
that is useful to lenders is the value of household debts. Banks do not share
information on their customers, hence households can hide the level of their
borrowing. Accordingly, we assume that the rule lenders follow is to accept













Equation (9) gives the maximum value of children's borrowing as a func-
tion of the parent's income and family size. Hence, in this model the e®ective
extent of liquidity constraint is an endogenous variable. Higher fertility has
a negative e®ect on children's education when the optimal value of invest-







10In the next sections we consider the case of a small open economy and
perfect international capital mobility. Accordingly, capital accumulation is
driven by the exogenous international rate of interest Rw,a n dd o m e s t i cs a v -
ings are unrelated to investments. This hypothesis also means that at any
time t the capital stock per unit of e®ective labor takes the value that ensures











We assume that the economy of the rest of the world is in steady state
with constant Rw. In the following sections symbols k;R;w without time
subscript denote the corresponding variables in eqs. (10) and (11).
As a relevant consequence of this hypothesis on the international capital
markets, both the optimal and constrained choices of human capital invest-






The comparison between the two alternatives depends on the future choice
of fertility of a child and on her family size. Child borrowing could be con-
strained if children living in large families were to prefer a signi¯cant invest-
ment in their skills because when adult they will build a small family. If
the size of children's family is too big, young individuals spend less than the
optimal amount on their education and will not have the desired number of
children.
Investment in education plays a crucial role in this model. Economic
growth depends on the accumulation of human capital. In the case of sub-
optimal expenditure for education, the rate of growth of per-capita income is
low and the economy converges to a low state of development. The opposite
regime of endogenous growth can be the outcome of economic dynamics
driven by the unconstrained choices of fertility and education. The rate of
fertility governs this change of regime of economic growth.
11In the following section we analyze the model dynamics when family size
is low enough to ensure that the ¯nancial system always provides enough
resources to ¯nance the optimal value of human capital investment.
3 Equilibrium growth with unconstrained hu-
man capital accumulation
The model describes an economy populated by individuals who, when young,
choose the optimal amount of expenditure in human capital investment and
¯nd in the credit market the relative amount of resources. Adult individuals
enjoy the returns of this investment and allocate labor earnings - net of debt
repayment - to consumption, savings, number and quality of children. These
decisions are consistent with the next generation's planned investment in
education.
Given the optimal choice of education that children make, the following









































[etw(1 ¡ nt¿) ¡ btR] (13)
where agent's perfect foresight implies: ne
t = nt: Parents have children up
to the number that equates a share ®
1+¯ of the earned income net of debt
12repayment to the opportunity cost of children. After some algebra, from eq.
(13) we get the optimal value of the fertility rate:
nt =
®









nl is a function of the parameters of preferences and technology, and it is
always smaller than 1
¿, the maximum value of fertility when time endowment
is allocated completely to child rearing.
We derive the dynamics of human capital from the production function











Given nt from eq. (14), education evolves from generation to generation
with a constant gross rate of growth °t which is greater than one if - among
other parameters - the technological parameter A and the ratio w=R are large
enough.
Equations (14) and (15) describe the dynamics of the model economy in
the case of unconstrained borrowing of children. We can then characterize
the competitive equilibrium of the economy. Given the initial values N0;e 0,a
dynamic equilibrium consists of sequences fkt;n t;e tg
1
t=0 such that the capital
market is in equilibrium - kt = k = f
0¡1 (Rw) - and fertility and education
are determined by eq. (14) and eq. (15). Hence, at the initial period the
economy instantly goes in equilibrium, and subsequently it grows along a
unique steady state path. In fact we de¯ne a steady state equilibrium of this
economy as a couple of stationary values (n;°) which are given by equations
(14) and (15).
Households choose the optimal rate of fertility which remains constant
over time. When population grows according to this equilibrium rate, chil-
dren can borrow on the credit market and can attain their planned level of
human capital. Earned incomes grow with human capital and the economy
provides further ¯nance to investment in education. This virtuous process of
economic growth unfolds into the future without limit.
134 Equilibrium growth with constrained hu-
man capital accumulation
A di®erent regime of economic growth applies to the model economy when
the optimal choice of investment in human capital cannot be fully ¯nanced by
loans. The desired amount of expenditure for education is greater than the
borrowing limit that lenders are willing to provide to each family member.
In this context, a linkage arises between children's investment in human
capital and the family's resources and size. Adult individuals are aware of the
consequence of their fertility choice on the resources available for children's
education and take it into account in their decisional rule concerning the



















































The left side of eq. (19) is the marginal utility of children which is the
sum of a positive e®ect of fertility and a negative e®ect on utility due to
the reduction of funds available for children's education. Hence, according
14to eq. (19) parents have children up to the number that equates marginal
bene¯ts to marginal costs measured in utils. In order to ensure non-negative










Some algebra on the full set of ¯rst order conditions gives the following


























,a s s u m e sp o s -
itive values, is continuous and increasing : If there exists an inverse function
of ©(nt), we can derive a nice description of the equilibrium dynamics of the
rate of fertility. This analytical development can be easily shown after the
introduction of some new notation. Accordingly, we de¯ne a new variable xt,
hours of labor:
xt ´ (1 ¡ nt¿);








It can be shown that:
@g(xt)
@xt ´ gx(xt) > 0;
@2g(xt)
@xt@xt ´ gxx (xt) < 0;









Lemma. Given Assumptions A1, A2, the function ©(nt) is continu-
ous, monotone increasing and convex, and there exists its inverse function
nt =© ¡1 (nt) ´ ª(nt¡1). ª(nt¡1) is continuous, monotone increasing and






Proof. See Appendix A.
This Lemma provides a characterization of the function ª(nt¡1)t h a t
describes the dynamics of the rate of fertility. From inspection of equation
(20) we derive the intersection of ª(nt¡1) with the horizontal axis. In fact
it can be easily veri¯ed that ª(nt¡1) assumes positive values when nt¡1
is greater than b nt¡1 ¸ 0. Furthermore, when nt¡1 takes the upper bound
nt¡1 = 1
¿ ,ª( nt¡1) takes a value lower than 1












1+¯+® , nt¡1 = 1
¿
The analysis of general equilibrium economic dynamics is based on the re-










Human capital grows along a path with a rate that is an inverse function
of the rate of fertility. The kind of dynamics that fertility follows depends
on the characterization of the di®erence function nt =ª( nt¡1)i nw h i c hw e
distinguish two cases: ª(nt¡1) crosses twice the 45 degree line; ª(nt¡1) lies
below the 45± line.
Figure 1 pictures the former case. There is clear evidence of multiple
steady states. The steady state in which fertility is high, nh, can be thought
16of as a low-development trap. In fact, when the economy converges to this
stable dynamic equilibrium the rate of fertility remains high and consequently
the constrained investment in education is low.
When ª(nt¡1) crosses the 45± line from below, the steady state is un-
stable. On the left of this steady state, fertility moves towards the origin of
the axes, but before reaching that value it meets the threshold value that
ensures escape from credit constraints. At that lower threshold, fertility
instantaneously takes the optimal value nl a n di n v e s t m e n ti ne d u c a t i o ni s
determined by the optimal choices of children.
Figure 1 contains all important information on the di®erent regimes of
economic growth produced by the model economy. When the initial value of
the fertility rate is low enough, a process of development can be described
by the progressive reduction of fertility and the joint increase of investment
in education by households who ¯nd an increasing amount of credit in the
market. This process may account for a major component of demographic
transition. In the case in which ª(nt¡1)l i e sb e l o wt h e4 5 ± line there exists
only one stable steady state at the optimal value of fertility nl.
In our model, low-development trap is the outcome of high fertility and
credit constraints which reinforce each other in economies whose initial fer-
tility rate is high. This picture seems consistent with important features of
the experiences of developing countries.
5 Econometric evidence
The main results of our theoretical analysis concern the existence of low and
high growth equilibria and the crucial role of family size in the selection of the
growth regime. In this section we provide some econometric evidence which
focuses on the main mechanism that drives economic dynamics under both
the regimes of growth: the extent of borrowing constraints and that of family
resources determine children's investment in human capital. Most of the re-
cent empirical literature on economic growth and human capital concentrates
on the determinants of the rate of growth of per capita GDP. As asserted by
Krueger and Lindahl at the end of their recent review article (Krueger and
Linahl, 2001), in the literature there is robust evidence on the role of level and
change in education in economic growth. This econometric evidence provides
us with an important motivation for research on the human capital-economic
17growth nexus, but it is not so useful in the appreciation of the many aspects
which lie behind this relation. The development of an educational system is
one of the crucial dimensions that distinguish industrialized from less devel-
oped countries. Hence, there is important scope for investigation of factors
which may hinder or promote human capital investment.
In spite of the extensive microeconometric literature on the educational
attainment of children (for a review see Haveman and Wolfe, 1995), more
scant is the existing econometric analysis of the determinants of education
at the country level. De Gregorio (1996) estimates regressions of secondary
and tertiary school enrollment ratios with respect to variables as per capita
GDP in 1970, expenditure in education and some ¯nancial variables. He
¯nds signi¯cant evidence of the e®ects of borrowing constraints on school
enrollment ratios. Similar evidence emerges from the regressions presented
in Benhabib and Spiegel (2000), where the dependent variable is the log
di®erence in years of schooling per worker.
In the following econometric analysis we concentrate on the explanation
of households' schooling decisions which are proxied by Enrol-sec, the sec-
ondary school gross enrollment ratio. The full set of explanatory variables
includes some proxies of family background and size, and proxies of ¯nancial
development and credit availability. Data refer to a set of 59 countries and
to three years: 1970, 1980, 1990. As a consequence of missing data we per-
formed separate regressions to evaluate the e®ects of family background and
credit market imperfections. In this way, each regression refers to a sample
of countries rather representative of the World.
From the World Bank database WISTAT we take HHsize, the average
household size. This variable is pivotal in our model of schooling decision,
hence it always appears in the regressions we performed. From the same
database we draw data on the share of female among household heads Fem-
head that is a good proxy for family strength. Actually, in many develop-
ing countries, women's economic conditions are much worse than those of
men, hence families that rely on female heads di®er greatly from the rest.
This e®ect should be better appreciated by the inclusion of the product
HHsize*Fem-head among regression variables. Data on Fem-head refer only
to one year, 1990 or around.
Real per capita GDP, Y, is a proxy for the wealth of a country, and the
product Y*HHsize is a proxy for the average household income. Parental
education and the social environment are considered by the proxy variable
18Sec25, the percentage of the population aged 25 and over that attained sec-
ondary school. These data are from Barro and Lee (2000). Schooling enroll-
ment decisions are certainly a®ected by public policy. The state shares with
households some of the costs of education, and we include the ratio of public
expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP, Geduc, among the regres-
sion variables. Families also bene¯t from several kinds of public transfers.
The share of expenditures on social security and welfare over GDP, SocSec,
is the proxy for that form of public aid to the family.
The ¯rst set of regressions of the school enrollment rate concerns those
variables proxying for family background. The selection of the estimation
method is driven by the Hausman test of the null hypothesis of individual
random e®ects versus the alternative of ¯xed e®ects.The possible in°uence of
variable endogeneity on the estimated parameters seems less important if we
consider that Enrol-sec could be thought of a predetermined variable in the
regressions for household size and school attainment of the adult population.
Actually, both variables, HHsize and Sec25, refer to decisions made in the
past by several generations of adults and should be largely una®ected by
schooling choices of the present generation. For example, the family size could
depend on the enrollment rate through the e®ect of schooling on fertility, but
data show a very lagged e®ect of fertility on HHsize. School enrollment could
appear also in regressions of per capita income, but even in this case it is
likely that this improvement in the quality of the labor force has a lagged
e®ect on economic growth. These hints are con¯rmed by 2SLS estimates
that show small di®erences of parameter estimates obtained with di®erent
methods.
Table 1 presents the results of estimates of school enrollment with respect
to variables proxying for the family background. Panel data estimates are of
the variance components model because this option follows from the Haus-
man test performed for each equation. At ¯rst glance, estimates con¯rm our
hypothesis on the importance of the family as a determinant of aggregate
schooling investment. Both the adult level of educational attainment, the
size and income of the family always take signi¯cant parameters with the
predicted sign. Gender of the family head contributes to the explanation of
the enrollment rate. This variable also contributes to the estimates when
multiplied to HHsize, signaling the signi¯cant di±culties that big families
with female head may face in ¯nancing educational investment of children.
From these regressions, the action of the state seems signi¯cant and positive
19when directed to the support of households' income (SocSec), but appears
less in°uential when addressed to the public ¯nance of education.
The second econometric model we specify for the secondary school enroll-
ment rate includes variables proxying for ¯nancial development and credit
issued to the private sector. The aim of this econometric exercise is a test of
the joint e®ects of family background and borrowing constraints on invest-
ment in education. The set of regressors is enlarged with the inclusion of
three proxies of the size and e±ciency of the ¯nancial system: Depth, Bank,
Credit. Depth is de¯ned by the ratio of liquid liabilities of the ¯nancial sector
to GDP. Bank is the ratio of deposit money bank assets and the sum of de-
posit money and central bank assets. Credit is the ratio of private credit by
deposit money banks and other ¯nancial institutions to GDP. Data are from
Beck, DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt and Levine (1999), who rely on IMF publications.
The econometric results are displayed in Table 2. The joint inclusion of
household's characteristics and ¯nancial variables ¯nds statistical support.
HHsize enters in many cases with strongly signi¯cant parameters with nega-
tive sign. The ¯nancial proxies show signi¯cant parameters, even if we cannot
investigate estimate robustness under more general speci¯cation due to the
lack of data for many countries and variables. The results suggest the impor-
tance of the interaction of family structure and resources with the ¯nancial
system for understanding country e®ort in human capital accumulation.
There already exists some evidence for the e®ects of ¯nancial develop-
ment on human capital investment. De Gregorio (1996) regresses the sec-
ondary and tertiary school enrollment ratios against the following variables:
consumer credit, the maximum loan-to-value ratio, the ratio between total
credit from the banking system to the non¯nancial private sector and the
GDP. Benhabib and Spiegel (2000) specify regressions of the change in the
l o go fa v e r a g ey e a r so fs c h o o l i n gi nt h el a b o rf o r c ew i t hr e s p e c tt ot h es a m e
variables we use plus income distribution. Our ¯ndings not only lend further
support to their results, but highlight the crucial role of the family for the
explanation of aggregate school enrollment.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has put forward a theoretical analysis of the family as a non-
market institution which - facing limited access to the credit market - pro-
20vides their chidren collateral in loan contracts aiming to ¯nance investments
in education. This collateral comes out of the parents' income and is a
decreasing function of family size. From this kind of educational funding
multiple equilibria derive. A stable trap of low-development is characterized
by high fertility rates and low investment in human capital. On the other
hand, economies with a su±ciently low starting rate of fertility grow accord-
ing to a process that may describe a demographic transition. In this case,
borrowing constraints gradually vanish and the process of growth reaches a
steady state characterized by the optimality of fertility and schooling choices.
Our theoretical analysis was complemented by some econometric evidence
that provides support for the main assumption of the model. Family size
and resources are among the most important determinants of human capital
investment even at an aggregate country level.
However, the existing literature lacks deeper investigation of the relations
between households and the ¯nancial markets. Further research could high-
light ways in which families choose to gather and redistribute ¯nances on
imperfect capital markets (Cigno, 1993; Behrman, J. R. 1997). This issue
could be an important part of models of economic growth and endogenous
fertility.
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Hence, applying these two results into the ¯rst and second derivatives of
©(nt) the ¯rst part of the Lemma can be easily proved. The proof of con-
cavity of the inverse function follows from the application of the implicit














Enrol-sec Ratio of secondary school enrollment to the population of the
age group that corresponds to the level of education, World Bank data.
Y Real GDP per capta in constant dollars, Penn World Tables 5.6.
Sec25 Percentage of secondary school attained in the total population
aged 25 and over, Barro and Lee (2000).
HHsize Average households size, WISTAT database World Bank.
Fem-head Percentage of female household heads, WISTAT database
World Bank.
Soc-sec Government expenditure on social security and welfare as a per-
centage of GDP, IMF from World bank data.
Geduc Government expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP,
IMF from World bank data.
Depth Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, lines 34 and 35 of the IFS, Beck,
T . ,A .D .D e m i r g u c - K u n t ,a n dR .L e v i n e .( 1 9 9 9 ) .
Bank Ratio of deposit money bank assets and the sum of deposit money
and central bank assets, IFS, Beck, T., A. D. Demirguc-Kunt, and R. Levine
(1999).
Credit Ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other ¯nancial
institutions to GDP, IFS, Beck, T., A. D. Demirguc-Kunt, and R. Levine
(1999).
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26Table 1. Regressions of the rate of enrollment at secondary schools.
The role of family and public resources. Dependent variable Enrol-sec.
Estimation V. C. V. C. V. C. V. C. V. C. 2
1 2 345
Sec25 0.190 0.188 0.141 0.187 0.173 0.16
(6.44) (6.41) (3.88) (6.23) (5.05) (2.5
Y 0.233 0.219 0.205 0.41
(4.50) (3.20) (3.49) (2.6
Y*HHsize 0.067 0.065
(4.73) (3.86)
HHsize -0.626 -0.881 -0.739 -0.849 -0.884 -0.6









Observations 177 177 108 147 138 147
R2 0.79 0.79 0.83 0.82 0.77 0.80
Hetero 1.25 (0.26) 1.46 (0.23) 1.82 (0.18) 0.76 (0.38) 0.67 (0.41)
Hausman test 2.87 (0.41) 2.77 (0.43) 4.99 (0.17) 11.69 (0.02) 1.27 (0.87)
Notes. Student's t are in parentheses. Hetero is a Lagrange multipli-
ers test of heteroskedasticity. In parentheses of Hetero and Hausman are
probability values.
27Table 2. Regressions of the rate of enrollment at secondary schools.
The e®ects of ¯nancial variables. Dependent variable Enrol-sec.








HHsize -0.062 -0.151 -0.169 -0.064
(-3.08) (-8.85) (-7.56) (-2.71)
Depth 0.393 0.172
(3.63) (2.46)
Credit -0.115 0.192 0.141
(-0.81) (2.50) (2.04)
Bank 0.210 0.304 0.095
(3.08) (3.45) (1.40)
Observations 117 132 132 132 132 117
R2 0.80 0.66 0.69 0.58 0.70 0.79
Heterosked. 1.08 (0.30) 0.25 (0.62) 2.61 (0.11) 3.17 (0.07) 0.63 (0.43) 0.84 (0.3
Hausman test 1.13 (0.57) 8.11 (0.02) 3.40 (0.18) 6.32 (0.1
Notes. Student's t are in parentheses. Hetero is a Lagrange multipli-
ers test of heteroskedasticity. In parentheses of Hetero and Hausman are
probability values.
28Figure 1: The dynamics of fertility under borrowing constraints
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